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This study examines whether companies report risk-relevant information to prospective investors.
While corporate risk communication is important for the well-functioning of capital markets, our cur-
rent understanding of risk reporting practices is limited. The sample consists of Dutch companies rais-
ing capital on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the late 1990s. In this setting, companies had much
discretion in writing the risk section of the prospectus. After a detailed content analysis of the risk sec-
tions, the author demonstrates that a measure of risk extracted from these texts successfully predicts the
volatility of companies’future stock prices, the sensitivity of future stock prices to market-wide fluctu-
ations, as well as severe declines in future stock prices. Overall, these results support the view that
prospectuses of Dutch companies provide adequate information about material investment risks.
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Our history of substantial net losses may continue indefinitely and make it difficult
to fund our operations.
VersaTel Telecom International N.V. (1999, p. 12)
This excerpt comes from the so-called “risk factor” section in the initial pub-
lic offering prospectus of VersaTel Telecom International. It provides an
example of warnings (risk factors) that corporate managers communicate to
buyers of shares in companies going public. Offering prospectuses are legal
documents, describing an enterprise to prospective investors. The risk factor
sections in these documents are intended to provide investors with a clear
and concise summary of the material risks to an investment in the issuers’
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments and suggestions from two anonymous review-
ers, John Penrose (editor, special issue), Robert Knechel, Steven Maijoor, and Mark Vluggen. Rogier
Deumes is an assistant professor at Maastricht University. Correspondence concerning this article should
be addressed to Rogier Deumes, Maastricht University, Department of Accounting and Information
Management, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands; e-mail: r.deumes@aim.unimaas.nl.
Journal of Business Communication, Volume 45, Number 2, April 2008 120-157
DOI: 10.1177/0021943607313992
© 2008 by the Association for Business Communication
 at Universiteit Maastricht on September 4, 2009  http://job.sagepub.com Downloaded from Deumes / CORPORATE RISK REPORTING 121
securities. As such, these sections have the potential to alter investors’ risk
judgments and promote sound investment decisions. Because there is little
empirical evidence on the information content of the risk factor sections, the
aim of this article is to explore if these texts actually contain risk-relevant
information for investors. For this purpose, I use a sample of 90 prospectuses
of Dutch companies and perform a detailed content analysis of the textual
information in the risk factor sections. Next, I examine to what extent an
aggregate risk measure extracted from the information in the texts success-
fully predicts future volatility of stock prices, the sensitivity of stock prices
to marketwide fluctuations, as well as large declines in future stock prices.
To facilitate linking the study to the communication practices of corporate
managers and their advisors, I assume a financial communication perspective
in this article.
1 Foremost, studying current risk disclosure practices can make
clear to financial communication practitioners if risk reporting in prospectuses
can be viewed as an area of best practice for corporate risk communication.
The latter has been suggested by professional bodies like the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), who see great merit
in better risk reporting (ICAEW, 1999). Based on an exploratory study of a
small number of prospectuses and annual reports of U.K. companies, the
ICAEW put forward that companies provide limited risk information in
annual reports but make more extensive risk disclosures in prospectuses.
Following up on this research, this study more formally tests the claim that
risk disclosure in prospectuses provides risk-relevant information to investors.
While this article views risk disclosure in prospectuses through a finan-
cial communication lens (focusing on shareholder relations and sharehold-
ers’concerns about investment risk), two issues need to be stressed before
proceeding. First, corporate communication is part of larger organizational
systems (Suchan & Charles, 2006). Other business functions traditionally
involved with financial communication include finance and accounting
(Argenti, 1996). Beside corporate communication research, I therefore
draw on research in these disciplinary areas to study risk disclosure prac-
tices in prospectuses. Second, the broader topic of risk communication that
this paper deals with clearly links to other subfunctions of corporate com-
munication, including media relations, employee relations, community
relations, and crisis communication. Within the field of public relations
research, for example, many studies have focused on employees’and com-
munities’concerns about health, safety, and environmental risks. Palenchar
and Heath (2007) provide a concise summary of this growing branch of risk
communication research, in which the stakes for participants in the communi-
cation process are evidently high (Kostelnick, 2007).
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The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section
discusses the motivation of the article and summarizes prior research.
Section 3 provides a brief background and formulates the research ques-
tion. Section 4 outlines the research design. Section 5 presents the results.
The final section summarizes the results, discusses certain limitations, and
considers potential implications of the study.
MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Studying risk disclosure is important because corporate transparency
about risk is vital for the well-functioning of capital markets. To achieve
and maintain an accurate valuation of a company’s stock, confident and
well-informed investors are necessary. Lacking adequate disclosure, man-
agers have superior information to outside investors, who may not fully
understand the underlying risks and rewards of a firm’s business (Hutton,
2004). By providing investors with information about the risk associated
with pursuing the company’s strategic goals, managers can increase trans-
parency and eliminate disparities between what investors understand and
expect and what management can deliver. This disclosure enables
investors to make more accurate corrections for risk when they value their
investments, thereby preventing stock prices from becoming unhinged
from intrinsic business value (i.e., prevent them from becoming critically
higher than they would be if the market had the information that is avail-
able to managers).
2 According to Fuller and Jensen (2002), “Trying to
mask the uncertainty that is inherent in every business is like pushing on
a balloon; smoothing out today’s bumps means they will only pop up
somewhere else tomorrow, often with catastrophic results” (p. 43).
Consequently, being clear about the risks and uncertainties involved can
prevent severe damage to the reputation and long-term health of a com-
pany that may otherwise result from overvalued corporate equity (Fuller
& Jensen, 2002).
Studying risk disclosure is important
because corporate transparency about
risk is vital for the well-functioning of
capital markets.
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Recognizing the potential benefits of risk disclosure to investors and
the long-run health and reputation of a company, an important question
becomes whether managers are forthright about the underlying risks in
their firms’ business. On the one hand, they may understand the benefits
of risk disclosure and realize that markets will penalize companies that
provide inadequate information relative to their peers. As a result, an
increasing number of managers may perceive that risk disclosure is a com-
petitive advantage in attracting capital. Furthermore, managers may fear
litigation and reputation costs if they do not provide sufficient risk infor-
mation to investors (Skinner, 1994, 1997). On the other hand, being can-
did about risk can cause the stock price to fall to a more sustainable level
in the short run. Short-sighted managers may not recognize that the asso-
ciated pain of this is slight compared to that arising from colluding in
myth-telling (Fuller & Jensen, 2002). Additionally, disclosure is not a
costless undertaking (Botosan, 1997). First, creating and distributing
timely and accurate risk information consumes valuable management
time. Second, managers may perceive that there is a cost imposed on the
firm by competitors who exploit the information to the detriment of the
disclosing firm. Third, there is the possibility of litigation in connection
with a disclosure. Finally, companies may be afraid to set a disclosure
precedent they cannot stick to (Hutton, 2004).
Prior Research
Corporate reporting has generated broad interest from business com-
munication researchers. Whereas some studies have investigated graphical
presentations of financial information (e.g., Courtis, 1997; Frownfelter-
Lohrke & Fulkerson, 2001) and photographs (Anderson & Imperia,
1992), many studies have examined narrative portions of annual reports,
mostly the president’s letter to shareholders and management’s discussion
and analysis. The focus in these studies varies considerably and includes
analyses of readability (Courtis & Hassan, 2002; Subramanian, Insley, &
Blackwell, 1993), positive and negative words and negative messages
(Crombie & Samujh, 1999; Hildebrandt & Snyder, 1981), thematic differences
(Kohut & Segars, 1992), linguistic structures (Thomas, 1997), rhetorical ele-
ments and symbolic meaning (Hyland, 1998; Prasad & Mir, 2002), verbal tone
(Ober, Zhao, Davis, & Alexander, 1999), and genre (Rutherford, 2005).
Focusing on different aspects, several researchers have investigated if past or
current performance of a company is reflected in the texts of corporate reports
(Hildebrandt & Snyder, 1981; Kohut & Segars, 1992; Rutherford, 2005;
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Thomas, 1997). Contributing to this literature, I investigate to what extent
texts of corporate reports reflect future outcomes.
Several findings in prior business communication research are relevant
for this study. First, managers seem predominantly optimistic in their writ-
ing (Hildebrandt & Snyder, 1981; Rutherford, 2005), seeking to create a
positive perception of themselves and their companies (Hyland, 1998).
Arguably, a bias toward the positive (the so-called “Pollyanna effect”) may
hinder managers in providing effective warning signals. Essentially, provid-
ing investors with information about risk demands explicit attention for the
downside. Second, Crombie and Samujh (1999) present a case of an exec-
utive who did focus on problems in his letter to shareholders. The problems
discussed were, however, relatively minor and seemingly intended to dis-
tract attention from more serious issues, thereby likely causing longer term
credibility problems (Crombie & Samujh, 1999). This case recalls the asser-
tion that what is omitted is as significant as what is included in a narrative
(Jameson, 2000). In the context of risk factor disclosure, texts that describe
every minor risk (without considering the likelihood and potential impact)
can obscure major risks. Third, Kohut and Segars (1992) find a predominant
emphasis on the past and conclude that executives feel more confident dis-
cussing a certain past than an uncertain future in their letter to shareholders.
This can further hinder providing risk-relevant information.
In the field of accounting, prior risk disclosure research has almost
exclusively focused on quantified risk disclosure in financial statements
and on specific categories of risk, especially market risk (e.g., Jorion,
2002; Linsmeier & Pearson, 1997; Rajgopal, 1999; Thornton & Welker,
2004), thereby overlooking narratives and possible interrelationships
among many types of risk that are present in an organization’s environ-
ment.
3 Notable exceptions of studies in accounting and finance that have
examined the relation between risk-related information extracted from
narratives and future outcomes are Abrahamson and Amir (1996) and,
more recently, Li (2006). The results of both studies suggest that risk-
related information in text can be used to assess future firm performance.
Abrahamson and Amir (1996) measure the information contained in the
president’s letter to shareholders in annual reports by counting the relative
number of words with a negative connotation used in a negative context.
In this way, they focus on linguistic style (how it is being said) rather than
linguistic content (what is being said). Assuming that words convey infor-
mation independent of their semantic context, Li (2006) measures empha-
sis on market risk in annual reports by counting the frequency of words
related to risk and uncertainty. Li argues that in a general setting such as
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annual reports, a context-specific measure of risk is difficult to establish
at this stage. A limitation of both studies is that only very few words could
actually be classified as expressing negativity or risk (0.4% and 0.04%,
respectively). Taking a different approach, this article extracts the content
of risk-related information in texts of risk sections relative to the particu-
lar context of their use.
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION
For standard setters, the burst of the Internet and telecom bubble and
the unanticipated subsequent collapse of large companies with a false
image of being low risk and highly predictable (e.g., Enron) created an
urgency to reconsider the set of requirements for disclosure of relevant
and understandable forward-looking information about risk. As a result,
narrative risk factor disclosure is nowadays increasingly required in peri-
odic reports (both annual and quarterly) by law or formal codes of best
practice in corporate governance worldwide. In prospectuses, regulators
have long since required firms to provide, under the caption “risk factors,”
a concise and logically organized discussion of the most significant fac-
tors that make an offering speculative or risky. This requirement offers the
opportunity to examine whether these documents actually contain risk-
relevant information.
A potential problem when regulating risk factor disclosure is that much
of the risk information is industry- and company specific and that the most
relevant information changes constantly, as a result of rapid economic and
technological changes. As put aptly by Hutton (2004), “Relevant infor-
mation does not lend itself to standardization” (p. 9). Recognizing this
problem, most standard setters allow firms a large degree of discretion in
drafting risk sections. The narratives must explain in simple language how
certain risk factors affect the company but should exclude risk factors that
could apply to any company. Furthermore, it is up to preparers of risk sec-
tions to decide which risk factors are significant and should therefore be
discussed. Consequently, some have argued that risk sections do not con-
tain reliable information, because the rules are “subjective, open-ended
and ambiguous, which allows firms to report almost anything (or nothing)
without violating the requirements” (Schrand & Elliot, 1998, p. 274).
Others have also questioned the qualitative nature of the information pro-
vided in risk sections. Quantification of risk disclosure, in contrast, is
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viewed as beneficial “because it improves the credibility of the disclosures and
makes them ex-post verifiable” (p. 280). Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally
(2001) maintain that narrative risk disclosures do not compensate for the
lack of quantitative risk information because “even if companies do disclose
this information, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for individuals to use
this qualitative information to generate their own quantitative risk assess-
ments” (p. 63). Concerns about the narrative nature of risk factor disclosure
may be unwarranted, though. Prior research shows that textual information
can help investors better predict future firm performance (Abrahamson &
Amir, 1996; Li, 2006). Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, Marilyn, and Robb (2003)
further document that a higher level of forward-looking non-financial dis-
closure in annual reports is associated with lower dispersion and higher
accuracy in financial analysts’earnings forecasts.
While current risk disclosure rules indeed depend on managers’willing-
ness to actively disclose the right information, risk sections in prospectuses
might contain reliable information for two related reasons. First, due to the
high information asymmetry when raising capital from outside investors,
market participants and regulators insist on the disclosure of material infor-
mation in prospectuses, especially when it concerns an initial public offer-
ing (Jog & McConomy, 2003). Second, the information contained in a
prospectus is the joint product of several parties. Underwriters (usually
investment banks) function as intermediaries between the company and
investors and coordinate drafting of the prospectus. Other parties involved
in preparing the prospectus are auditors and lawyers. While auditors provide
assurance to the issuers’financial statements, lawyers advise on the disclo-
sures required in the narrative sections, including the risk section (Draho,
2004). The heightened litigation and reputation risk for all parties involved
leads to intense scrutiny, more so than for annual reports (Hribar, 2004).
Concerns about the narrative nature
of risk factor disclosure may be
unwarranted, though. Prior research
shows that textual information can
help investors better predict future
firm performance.
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Research Question
The lack of empirical evidence on the informative nature of narrative
risk disclosures motivates me to explore the following research question:
Do the texts of risk factor sections in prospectuses contain risk-relevant
information for investors? To address this research question, I followed a
two-stage approach. First, I extracted a reliable aggregate measure of risk
disclosure from the texts. Second, I examined whether this measure was
associated with a number of outcomes in the period after publication of
the prospectus: (a) future total return risk (volatility of the stock price);
(b) future systematic risk (sensitivity of stock price to market-wide fluc-
tuations); and (c) the likelihood of severe declines in stock price.
Finding a significantly positive association between the risk disclosure
measure obtained from the texts and the above-mentioned outcomes
would demonstrate that companies that turn out relatively risky ex-post
are generally disclosing more risk ex-ante. Alternatively, finding a signif-
icantly negative association would show that companies that turn out rel-
atively risky ex-post are generally disclosing less risk ex-ante. While the
former would support the claim that managers are actively providing risk-
relevant information in risk sections (i.e., the texts represent what they




The data that I used in this study were obtained from 90 prospectuses
of Dutch firms that issued securities on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in
the period from 1997 to 2000.
5 More specifically, the sample includes 49
(54%) initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock, 31 (34%) sea-
soned offerings of common stock and/or convertible bonds, and 10 (11%)
stock offerings relating to a merger or demerger.
The information required in a prospectus is set out in the listing and
issuing rules of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. While the regulations
require a risk assessment to be included in the prospectus, they provide no
further guidance on the nature, degree, and form.
6 This lack of guidance
allows companies and other parties involved in writing the risk sections a
large degree of freedom in expressing their judgment. The cover of the
prospectus typically refers to the risk section as “certain factors that
should be carefully considered by prospective investors.”
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data and value-weighted index data) were retrieved from the financial
database “DATASTREAM.”
Institutional Setting
While the Dutch capital market is well-developed, the institutional
environment in the Netherlands has some unique characteristics that likely
affect the quantity and quality of corporate disclosure in general.
7 First,
Dutch companies make extensive use of anti-takeover mechanisms (De
Jong, Kabir, Marra, & Röell, 2001; Kabir, Cantrijn, & Jeunink, 1997),
thereby reducing the threat that management is replaced by a raider. In
corporate control models, this threat disciplines managers (e.g., Grossman
& Hart, 1980). Consequently, Dutch managers likely face lower pressure
from the capital market to publicly account for their performance via cor-
porate reports. Second, like in some other Continental European coun-
tries, Dutch firms have a two-tier board structure (Douma, 1997). To the
extent that this results in better monitoring of management’s performance
by independent boards, there could be less need for monitoring by outside
shareholders and, consequently, less incentives for management to pub-
licly disclose information. Third, management or large shareholders often
hold large parts, or even the majority, of outstanding shares (De Jong
et al., 2001; Kabir et al., 1997). Large shareholders are often thought to
have better access to operational information (i.e., lower information
asymmetry) and have higher incentives to monitor management’s perfor-
mance (e.g., Schleifer & Vishny, 1986). Managerial ownership better aligns
the interests of management and shareholders (e.g., Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Economic theory predicts that both the alignment of interests and
better monitoring by large shareholders reduce potential problems
between management and shareholders (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976),
thereby reducing the need for public reporting. Consequently, the overall
institutional environment in the Netherlands seems to make it less evident
in advance that management discloses relevant information to outside
investors. From an international perspective, the Dutch environment is
therefore an interesting setting to study disclosure practices.
The time period in which this study is conducted is also interesting,
because public equity markets in the late 1990s seemed willing to invest
in high-risk companies that never made profits and might never do so.
Although the new prospects looked very promising, with the benefit of
hindsight the risks of investing in these companies were not clear at the
128 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS COMMUNICATION
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risk sections in prospectuses actually reflected the material risks.
Extracting an Aggregate Measure of Risk (RDS)
In previous research on IPOs, the number of risk factors described in the
risk section of the prospectus is a common proxy for ex-ante risk (e.g.,
Beatty & Welch, 1996; Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Feltham, Hughes, & Simunic,
1991; Simunic & Stein, 1987). A simple count of these risk factors com-
bines them into one single measure that is comparable to a summated scale.
8
An advantage of this approach is that it does not focus on one particular risk,
that is, isolating specific risks to the exclusion of other possibly interrelated
risk factors. However, a disadvantage of adding up (different) risk factors is
that unidimensionality and internal consistency of the risk factors are
assumed but cannot be tested for. Unidimensionality and internal consis-
tency are essential requirements for a composite measure and imply that the
composite measure should consist of risk factors that load highly on one sin-
gle dimension (Hattie, 1985; McDonald, 1981) and are strongly associated
with each other, representing a single concept (Nunnally, 1978). For a mul-
tifaceted concept like risk, however, unidimensionality and internal consis-
tency are not realistic assumptions when simply counting the number of risk
factors disclosed in the risk sections of the prospectuses.
Instead of a mere count of the number of risk factors, the alternative
approach taken in this study is to investigate the attributes of the risks
described. A discovery-oriented procedure known as content assessment
was applied first. The purpose of this procedure was to take an open-ended
look at the risk sections across prospectuses to make a preliminary identi-
fication of the kinds of risk that are described. Next, a content analysis
was undertaken to systematically evaluate the content of the risk sections.
The content analysis involved three broad stages: (a) development of an
appropriate coding scheme that lists the expected risk factors that are dis-
closed in the risk sections; (b) coding of the texts of the risk sections; and
(c) reduction of data into composite measures of risk disclosure. Each
stage is discussed below in more detail.
Coding scheme. In the first stage, a wide range of literature on risk and
risk management was used to develop an appropriate coding scheme that
lists broad content categories and different risk factors related to these cat-
egories (see Miller, 1992, for an overview of this literature and a similar
categorization of risk). Column 1 of Table 1 summarizes the final coding
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risk factors. Each risk factor of the coding scheme is described by a num-
ber of words or phrases that detail the meaning of the risk factor. Typical
examples of risk factors per category are provided in the Results section,
which also further explains Table 1.
Coding procedure. In the second stage, I matched the words and
phrases in the texts of the risk sections with the coding scheme and iden-
tified for each text whether or not the risk factor was mentioned. A pretest
was performed on a subset of the sample, providing further understanding
of the textual disclosures. As a result, several risk factors of the coding
scheme were refined and others were added. Using the improved coding
scheme, the coding process was applied to the full sample.
An advantage of this manual approach over a computer-aided content
analysis is that humans can better judge the meaning of words and phrases
within a context. A disadvantage is that a manual approach is less cost-
effective and flexible. In addition, human raters can make mistakes and
are prone to researcher bias (Krippendorff, 2004). To assure the reliability
of the coding process, two trained, independent raters coded the texts.
Percentage agreement for the risk factors ranged from 83% to 100%.
Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) interjudge reliability index ranged from .82
to 1.00, where .80 (and .70 in exploratory research) is considered a lower
limit. All coding discrepancies were resolved by jointly reexamining the
texts and determining an appropriate identification.
Data reduction. The third stage of the content analysis concerned a sta-
tistical reduction of the collected data (48 dichotomous variables for each
firm in the sample, each variable representing a different risk factor) into
a smaller set of new, composite dimensions or component scores with a
minimum loss of information. While the nature and character of the orig-
inal data are retained, a smaller set of composite measures enables subse-
quent multivariate empirical analyses.
The technique that was used for this purpose is principal components
analysis by alternating least squares optimal scaling (PRINCIPALS).
9
Compared to standard principal components analysis, which assumes lin-
ear relationships between numeric variables, PRINCIPALS allows vari-
ables to be scaled at the nominal or ordinal level. In addition, the method
substantially increases the number of variables that can be included in the
analysis, given a certain sample size. PRINCIPALS is used as an
exploratory technique that does not set any a priori constraints on the
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Table 1. Overview of Risk Disclosures and Results of
Principal Components Analysis by Alternating Least
Squares Optimal Scaling (PRINCIPALS)
% of Firms 
% of Reported  Reporting
Risk Factor Risk Factors on Factor 1 2 3
Macro environmental sources 22
Economic
General economic conditions 78 — — .74
Currency, interest, and 61 — — .40
price fluctuations
Political 30 — — —
Social and environmental 11 — — —
Regulation and legislation 69 .58 — —
Technological change 44 .56 — —
Industry sources 29
Competition 74 .57 — —
Potential entrants 37 .56 — —
Substitutes 31 .53 — —
Suppliers 35 — — .49
Strategic partners 37 .60 — —
Customers
Market acceptance 12 .59 — —
Dependence on clients 48 — — —
Changing client requirements 19 — — .45
Seasonality demand 20 — — —
Personnel 63 — .51 —
Internal sources 29
Dependence on management 60 — — —
Dependence on product 14 — — —
Research and development 41 .56 — —
Intellectual property rights 31 .53 — —
Product defects 19 — — —
Liability 46 — .50 —
Accounts receivable 16 — — —
Information systems  13 — — —
and controls
Limited flexibility  16 — — —
cost structure
Debt covenants 11 .55 — —
Excessive debt 12 .53 — —
Management of growth 41 — .66 —






 at Universiteit Maastricht on September 4, 2009  http://job.sagepub.com Downloaded from 132 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS COMMUNICATION
Table 1. (continued)
% of Firms 
% of Reported  Reporting
Risk Factor Risk Factors on Factor 1 2 3
Other sources 5
Millennium 43 — — —
Euro 20 — — —
Loss and probability of loss 3
History of losses and expectation  11 .69 — —
to continue to incur losses
Dilution due to future sale of shares 22 .72 — —
Variance 3
Volatility of share price 20 .76 — —
Variability of operating results 16 — — .54
Lack of information 5
Limited operating history 11 .52 — —
Accuracy of forward- 10 .55 — —
looking statements
Absence of prior public market 51 — .63 —
Lack of control 5
Takeover defenses 15 .40 — —
Influence of large shareholder 45 — — —
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha .91 .85 .82
Eigenvalue 11.82 6.04 5.37
% total variance 24.62 12.59 11.19
Note: Shown are risk factors that were reported by at least 10% of the firms in the sample.




estimation of components or the number of dimensions to be extracted.
Theoretical support or prior research that justifies a confirmatory
approach is currently lacking. Hence, an exploratory approach is consid-
ered most useful as a data reduction method.
The data reduction procedure resulted in three component scores that
were named Risk Disclosure Score 1, 2, and 3 (RDS1, RDS2, and RDS3).
The following section provides detailed results on these component
scores. Because RDS1explains about twice as much variance of the risk
factors as RDS2 and RDS3 and represents far more risk factors than RDS2
and RDS3, the main analyses focus on RDS1. Supplementary analyses
considered RDS2 and RDS3.
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Association Between RDS1,
Total Return Risk, and Systematic Risk
Total return risk (TRR) is commonly defined as the standard deviation
of stock returns. Systematic risk (BETA) is defined as the covariance of
stock returns and returns on the market portfolio, divided by the variance
of returns on the market portfolio (Fama & MacBeth, 1973). A value-
weighted index of all stocks listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange is
used to calculate the returns on the market portfolio. To investigate the
association between RDS1 and future TRR and future BETA, I estimate
the following models for the full sample:
TRR(+T) = β0 + β1 RDS1 + ε (1)
BETA(+30) = β0 + β1 RDS1 + ε (2)
In Model 1, TRR(+T) represents future TRR and was calculated using T
observations of monthly stock returns after publication of the prospectus (at
least 6 and at most 30 observations of monthly stock returns). BETA(+30)
in Model 2 represents future BETA and was calculated using 30 observa-
tions of monthly stock returns after publication of the prospectus.
10
For a subsample of firms with a seasoned offering and, consequently, a
history of stock returns, I additionally estimated the following models:
TRR(+T) = β0 + β1 RDS1 + β2 TRR(−18) + ε (3)
BETA(+30) = β0 + β1 RDS1 + β2 BETA(+30) + ε (4)
In Model 3, TRR(–18) represents past TRR and was calculated using
18 observations of monthly stock returns before the publication of the
prospectus. BETA(–30) in Model 4 represents past BETA and was calcu-
lated using 30 observations of monthly stock returns before publication of
the prospectus. Both TRR(–18) and BETA(–30) were viewed as alterna-
tive forecasts of future risk and were used as a benchmark for RDS1.
Association Between RDS1 and
Severe Declines in Stock Price (FAIL)
Riskier firms can be expected to have a higher probability of extreme
negative outcomes, particularly if managers typically associate risk with
negative outcomes (March & Shapira, 1987). For a sample of IPO firms,
Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997) find that a simple count of the
number of risk factors listed in the offering prospectus is significantly
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related to the failure to survive in the aftermarket, which is defined as
delisting from the trading exchange for negative reasons, for example, a
stock price below the acceptable level (so-called “penny stocks”). Listing
and issuing rules of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, however, do not
require delisting of firms in case their stock price falls below five Euro or
even one Euro. For this reason, I defined stock price failure as stocks trad-
ing at a price below one or five Euro, 30 months after publication of the
prospectus [FAIL1(+30) and FAIL5(+30)]. For the full sample, I esti-
mated the following model:
FAIL(+30) = β0 + β1 RDS1 + ε (5)
Control Variables
I used a number of control variables in the models outlined above. To
control for firm size, I added the variable SIZE, which is defined as the
natural logarithm of the market value of the firm in million Euro one
month after publication of the prospectus. To control for industry
effects, I added an indictor variable IND that is equal to one if the firm
operates in a high-risk industry (information technology, biotechnol-
ogy, or telecommunication), and zero otherwise. In the models esti-
mated for the full sample, I also controlled for the type of offering by
adding an indicator variable IPO that is equal to one for IPO firms, and
zero otherwise.
11
Riskier firms can be expected to have
a higher probability of extreme nega-
tive outcomes, particularly if managers
typically associate risk with negative
outcomes.
RESULTS
This section addresses five areas: content analysis of risk sections, pre-
dicting TRR and BETA, predicting FAIL, supplementary analysis, and
robustness checks.
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Content Analysis of Risk Sections
The content analysis reveals that management mostly assigned the label
“risk” to factors, either external or internal to the firm, that could adversely
impact future firm performance. In this sense, risk actually referred to
sources of downside risk. In no single risk section did management refer to
risk as being associated with the probability of high performance. These
findings confirm March and Shapira’s (1987) observations of high-level
executives’risk perceptions.
12
The first column of Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the kinds
of risk that were identified in the risk sections of the prospectuses. In
accordance with Miller’s (1992) integrated risk framework, I broadly clas-
sified the sources of risk as related to the following: (a) the macro envi-
ronment; (b) the industry environment; (c) the internal environment of the
firm; and (d) other.
Apart from describing sources of risk, management’s discussion of risk
frequently resembles investors’ conceptualization of risk as surveyed by
Baird and Thomas (1990) and Olsen (1997).
13 For this reason, I discerned
four additional categories:
• Loss or probability of loss; for example, “We have a history of losses and
expect to continue to incur losses in the foreseeable future,” “The share
price may decrease due to future sale of shares,” “Shares purchased in this
offering will be diluted immediately because the initial offering price is
substantially higher than the book value per share.”
• Variance; for example, “Our share price may be volatile,” “Our operating
results may be subject to significant fluctuations.”
• Lack of information; for example, “Limited relevance of historic activities
and financial performance,” “Our forward-looking statements may not be
accurate,” “Lack of operating history.”
• Lack of control; for example, “Anti-takeover provisions may prevent a ben-
eficial change of control,” “Control by principal shareholder.”
The second column of Table 1 displays for each risk factor the percentage of
firms that reported on a particular factor. The four most frequently reported risk
factors, in order of frequency of reporting, were the following:
• General economic conditions (78%); for example, “Sensitivity of results to
economic developments,” “Fluctuations in the general economy.”
• Competition (74%); for example, “We operate in a highly competitive
industry.”
 at Universiteit Maastricht on September 4, 2009  http://job.sagepub.com Downloaded from • Regulation and legislation (69%); for example, “The company’s ability to
commercialize its products depends upon its compliance with government
regulations,” “Unexpected changes in regulatory requirements could
adversely affect our business.”
• Acquisitions, alliances, and joint-ventures (69%); for example, “Costs and
difficulties of acquiring and integrating businesses could impede future
growth,” “No assurance can be given that desired acquisitions and alliances
will be available.”
Aggregating the reported risk factors per category, the most frequently
disclosed risk factors appeared to be related to the industry environment
and the internal environment of the firm (both 29%), followed by the
macro environment (22%) and the other categories (20% in total).
Table 1 also presents the results of the statistical reduction of the col-
lected data using PRINCIPALS. As expected, the risk disclosures were not
unidimensional. I extracted three dimensions that together accounted for
48% of the variance of the risk factors. The eigenvalues were used to
decide how many dimensions should be used in the analysis.
14 Using a
plot of the eigenvalues (so-called “scree test”), all dimensions were
retained with eigenvalues in the sharp descent part of the plot before the
eigenvalues started to level off. Component loadings exceeding .40 are
considered important; if the component loadings are .50 or greater, they
are considered practically significant (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black,
1998). The squared loading reflects the amount of a risk factor’s total vari-
ance that is accounted for by the component score.
For each dimension, component loadings exceeding .40 are displayed in
Table 1. Higher component loadings represent a higher correlation of the
risk factor and the component score. As can be seen, the component load-
ings were scattered across the eight categories. Dimension 1 had the high-
est eigenvalue (11.82) and accounted for 25% of the variance of the risk
factors. The component score of Dimension 1 was simply named Risk
Disclosure Score 1 (RDS1). Conceptually, RDS1 represents the degree to
which each firm in the sample reported on the group of risk factors that had
high loadings on Dimension 1. Thus, the more disclosure of risk factors
with high loadings on Dimension 1, the higher RDS1. As can be seen in
Table 1, management’s warning for future volatility of the share price had
the highest component loading on Dimension 1 (.76), followed by the pos-
sibility of dilution of the share price (.72), a history of losses and the expec-
tation to continue to incur losses (.69), and dependence on strategic partners
(.60). Twelve other frequently reported risk factors have loadings between
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.50 and .60. Cronbach’s coefficient alpha assessed the internal consistency
of RDS1, and its value of .91 was well above the generally agreed lower
limit of .70 (Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991). Hence, RDS1 was a
statistically reliable composite measure.
Dimensions 2 and 3 accounted for 13% and 11% of the variance of the
risk factors, and the component scores were RDS2 and RDS3, respec-
tively. Conceptually, RDS2 and RDS3 represent the degree to which each
firm in the sample reported on the group of risk factors that had high load-
ings on Dimensions 2 and 3. Management’s warning about their ability to
manage growth had the highest component loading on Dimension 2 (.66),
followed by absence of a prior public market (.63). Only two other risk
factors had loadings between .50 and .60 on Dimension 2. The most fre-
quently reported risk factor, general economic conditions, loaded highly
on Dimension 3 (.74). Only one other risk factor had a loading between
.50 and .60 on Dimension 3. Cronbach’s coefficient alphas of RDS2 and
RDS3 were adequate, suggesting that RDS2 and RDS3 were also statisti-
cally reliable composite measures.
Although PRINCIPALS reduced the widely diverse risk disclosures
into three unidimensional and statistically reliable composite measures of
risk disclosure (which was the main purpose of the data reduction proce-
dure), it is unclear what caused the different dimensions in the risk dis-
closures. Because RDS1 explained about twice as much variance as RDS2
and RDS3 and represented far more risk factors (16 component loadings
above .50 compared to 4 and 2 for RDS1 and RDS2, respectively), the
main empirical analyses focused on RDS1. Supplementary analyses (see
below) considered RDS2 and RDS3.
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of RDS1 for the full sample.
Due to the statistical procedure that was used to construct the variable,
RDS1 had a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Table 2 also
shows the descriptive statistics of RDS1 for separate subsamples of sea-
soned and unseasoned offerings, and high-risk and low-risk industries.
Additional tests showed that the difference in RDS1 for seasoned offer-
ings and unseasoned offerings was significant (p < .05), indicating that
management makes more extensive risk disclosures in the case of an ini-
tial public offering. In addition, firms in a high-risk industry had signifi-
cantly higher RDS1 (p < .01).
Table 2 further displays the descriptive statistics of all test and control
variables. The total number of observations N decreased in the period
after the offering due to delisting of firms that merged or were taken over.
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eight firms in the sample (10%) had a stock price that was lower than
one Euro.
Panel A of Table 3 presents the correlations among the independent
variables in the models tested. RDS1 was significantly positively corre-
lated with SIZE (p < .01), IND (p < .01), IPO (p < .05), TRR(–18) (p <
.01), and BETA(–30) (p < .01), suggesting that RDS1 reflected, to some
extent, firm size, industry type, offering type, past total return risk, and
past systematic risk. Panel A of Table 3 further shows that IPO firms in the
sample were significantly smaller and significantly more often active in a
high-risk industry (p < .01). As could be expected, firms in a high-risk
industry had significantly higher past total return risk (p < .01) and sig-
nificantly higher past systematic risk (p < .01). Despite the relatively high
correlations among the independent variables, additional tests for multi-
collinearity showed no indication of any potential harmful effects in the
multivariate regressions reported next.
Predicting TRR and BETA
Univariate results in Panel B of Table 3 show that RDS1 was signifi-
cantly positively correlated with TRR(+T) up to 30 months after publica-
tion of the prospectus (p < .01) and with BETA(+30) (p < .01). This
finding provides initial support for the idea that companies were actively
providing risk-relevant information in risk sections. Compared to the cor-
relation coefficient for TRR(–18), the coefficient for RDS1 was higher for
months 6, 12, and 18 but lower for months 24 and 30. Compared to the
correlation coefficient for BETA(–30), the correlation coefficient for
RDS1 was also lower. For the purpose of illustration, Figure 1 divides the
sample into three equal portfolios based on the ranking of RDS1 from low
to high. For each portfolio, I plotted TRR(+T) up to 30 months after pub-
lication of the prospectus. As Figure 1 shows, the high RDS1 portfolio had
consistently higher TRR than the low RDS1 portfolio. The difference was
on average eight percentage points and was statistically significant for all
months (p < .01).
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regression
analyses of Model 1 including control variables. To be able to assess the
relative predictive ability of RDS1 against the control variables, I con-
verted all variables to z scores and reported the standardized coefficients.
All estimated regressions were significant (p < .01), and the adjusted R
2s
140 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS COMMUNICATION
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range from 30% to 54%. RDS1 remained significantly positively associ-
ated with TRR(+T) up to 30 months after publication of the prospectus
(p < .01), showing that RDS1 was successful in predicting TRR(+T) in
addition to the control variables. The magnitude of the standardized coef-
ficients further shows that RDS1 had more predictive value than SIZE and
IPO, whose coefficients were not significantly different from zero. Until
month 18, RDS1 also had more predictive value than IND; thereafter, the
standardized coefficients for IND were higher than for RDS1.
Panel C of Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions
of Model 2. Again, standardized coefficients are reported. The estimated
model was significant (p < .01), and the adjusted R
2 was 46%. RDS1 was
significantly positively associated with BETA(+30) (p  < .01). Hence,
RDS1 predicted future BETA in addition to the control variables. The
magnitude of the standardized coefficients further indicates that RDS1
had more predictive value than SIZE and IPO (whose coefficients were














Number of Months After Publication of the Prospectus
Figure 1. Average Total Return Risk (TRR) of Three
Portfolios Chosen on the Basis of the
Ranking of Risk Disclosure Score 1 (RDS1)
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Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions
of Model 3. Again, all regressions were significant (p < .01), and the
adjusted R
2s ranged from 62% to 79%. RDS1 was significantly positively
associated with TRR(+T) up to 30 months after publication of the
prospectus (p < .05). The standardized coefficients of TRR(–18) were not
significantly different from zero, indicating that RDS1 had more predic-
tive value than past TRR. The findings further show that RDS1 had more
predictive value than SIZE (whose coefficients were not significantly dif-
ferent from zero) but less than IND (whose coefficients were significantly
positive and, except for month 6, higher than the coefficients of RDS1).
Panel D of Table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regressions
of Model 4. The model was significant (p < .01), and the adjusted R
2 was
60%. Both RDS1 and BETA(–30) were significantly positively associated
with BETA(+30) (p < .01). However, the magnitude of the standardized
coefficient for BETA(–30) was lower than for RDS1, indicating that
RDS1 had more predictive value than past systematic risk. RDS1 also had
more predictive value than SIZE and IND, whose coefficients were not
significantly different from zero.
In sum, the results for Models 1 to 4 show that RDS1 was successful in
predicting future total return risk and future systematic risk. These results
provide strong support for the idea that companies were generally provid-
ing risk-relevant information in risk sections. Furthermore, the informa-
tion in the risk sections appears to be more relevant than past total return
risk and past systematic risk. The latter finding provides additional sup-
port for the view that the information in risk sections reflected material
risks to an investment in the issuers’ securities.
Predicting FAIL
Univariate results in Panel B of Table 3 show that RDS1 was signifi-
cantly positively correlated with FAIL1(+30) and FAIL5(+30) (p < .01).
These results provide initial support for the notion that the information in
risk sections warns for the possibility of large negative outcomes.
Furthermore, the information in the risk
sections appears to be more relevant
than past total return risk and past
systematic risk.
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Table 5 presents the results of logistic regressions of Model 5. The
model’s chi-squares were significant (p < .01), and RDS1 remained sig-
nificantly positively correlated with FAIL1(+30) and FAIL5(+30) (p < .01
and p < .05, respectively). This result further confirmed the relevance of
the forward-looking risk information. Nagelkerke’s pseudo R
2 was 48%
and 36% for FAIL1(+30) and FAIL5(+30), respectively. In addition to a
higher pseudo R
2, the model for FAIL1(+30) had a higher coefficient for
RDS1 than the model for FAIL5(+30). Hence, RDS1 appeared to be bet-
ter at predicting more extreme stock price failures.
Overall, the results for Model 5 show that RDS1 was successful in pre-
dicting future stock price failures, especially the more extreme ones. This
provides further support for the view that the information in risk sections
reflected material risks to an investment.
Supplementary Analysis
The main analyses focus exclusively on RDS1. Alternatively, I included
all three component scores in Models 1 to 5 and performed all tests. For
reasons of brevity, these results are not reported in tabular form. The
results confirmed the associations reported for RDS1 but provided no evi-
dence that RDS2 or RDS3 were associated with TRR(+T), BETA(+30), or
FAIL(+30). While this indicates that disclosure of risk factors represented
by RDS2 and RDS3 was not useful for predicting total return risk, sys-
tematic risk, and severe declines in stock price, it does not preclude that
these risk factors conveyed other information relevant to investors.
From the texts analyzed in this study, 67% were written in English and
33% in Dutch. Using moderated regression analysis, I further analyzed
whether the language in which the prospectus was written significantly
affected the reported associations between RDS1 and TRR(+T),
BETA(+30), and FAIL(+30). The results (not reported in tabular form)
showed no systematic difference, suggesting that language did not influ-
ence the informativeness of the risk sections.
Robustness Checks
When coding the texts of the risk sections, I alternatively identified for
each text how often each risk factor was present (instead of whether the
risk factor was present or not). The component scores that result from
using the counts per risk factor were almost identical (correlation coeffi-
cients > .98 with p < .01), and the results of all empirical tests were robust
to using these component scores.
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and their securities were traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 31%
of the companies in the sample had a cross-listing at a foreign stock
exchange, typically in the United States (NYSE or NASDAQ) or in the
United Kingdom (London Stock Exchange). Likely, these firms faced more
rigorous disclosure requirements. To mitigate potential doubts about the
homogeneity of the sample resulting from different regulatory environ-
ments, I additionally included in all regressions separate indicator variables
to control for a cross-listing at the NYSE, the NASDAQ, and the London
Stock Exchange. The results (not reported in tabular form) show that the
inclusion of these indicators did not qualitatively change the results for the
variables of interest (i.e., the reported findings were not biased due to their
omission). Reported results were also robust to adding several other addi-
tional control variables in all models (not reported in tabular form), includ-
ing (a) an indicator for the language in which the prospectus was written,
(b) indicators for the year or quarter in which the securities were offered,
(c) indicators for companies active in the manufacturing and trade sector,
(d) the book-to-market ratio of equity, and (e) financial leverage.
To further check the robustness of the findings, the tests for the full sam-
ple were also performed for subsamples of high-risk industries and low-
risk industries. The results (not reported in tabular form) show that the
associations between RDS1 and TRR(+T), BETA(+30), and FAIL(+30)
remained intact. Findings were also robust to excluding any specific quar-
ter in which the securities were offered from the sample. To check the
robustness of the results of Models 2 and 4 for the calculation of BETA, I
excluded the last year of security issues from the sample and calculated
BETA(+42). Using BETA(+42) instead of BETA(+30) led to identical con-
clusions. To check the robustness of the results of Model 5 for the defini-
tion of future stock price failure, I alternatively calculated severe stock
price declines of more than 50% or more than 75% over a 30-month period.
These extreme negative returns are labeled FAIL50(+30) and
FAIL75(+30), respectively. The results, which are presented in Panel B of
Table 3 and in Table 5, led to identical conclusions.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I examined whether narrative risk disclosures in prospec-
tuses generally contain risk-relevant information for prospective investors.
The data that I used were obtained from a sample of 90 prospectuses of
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Dutch firms raising capital on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the late
1990s. To obtain an aggregate measure of risk from the information in the
texts, I performed a detailed content analysis of the risk sections in the
prospectuses. The content analysis revealed that management mostly
assigns the label “risk” to a multitude of factors, either internal or exter-
nal to the firm, that can adversely impact future firm performance and can
cause future operating results and stock prices to be volatile. The results
of further empirical tests showed that an aggregate measure of risk
obtained by the content analysis successfully predicts the following:
• future total return risk (volatility of future stock prices);
• future systematic risk (sensitivity of future stock prices to market-wide
fluctuations); and
• the likelihood of severe declines in stock price in the 30-month period after
publication of the prospectus.
Notably, these results held when controlling for several other factors, includ-
ing firm size, type of industry, type of offering, cross-listing at a foreign
exchange, and the language in which the prospectus was written. The results
further showed that when it comes to predicting future risk, the information
extracted from the texts is more successful than market information on past
risk. I conclude from these findings that prospectuses of Dutch firms in
general clearly contain risk-relevant information for prospective investors.
Limitations
The findings should be interpreted with some limitations in mind relat-
ing to the statistical reduction of the data, which was required to obtain an
aggregate measure of risk. First, due to the exploratory nature of the tech-
nique, it is unclear what caused the different dimensions in the data. This
fact makes it difficult to put a label on the component scores. Second, sev-
eral risk factors identified in the texts did not load significantly on any of
the three dimensions resulting from the data reduction. Basically, this
implies that these risk factors could not be measured reliably in this study.
Consequently, I can draw no conclusions about the potential relevance of
these risk factors. Third, while the findings suggest that the risk factors
represented by RDS2 and RDS3 were not helpful for predicting future
total return risk, systematic risk, and large declines in stock price, it is
unclear whether they are useless to investors or contain relevant informa-
tion about other future outcomes that are not examined in this study. Due
 at Universiteit Maastricht on September 4, 2009  http://job.sagepub.com Downloaded from to these limitations, I believe the findings provide a conservative assess-
ment of the information content of risk sections.
More generally, a limitation of the study is that it exclusively focuses
on what the risk sections contain. Further research is needed to gain a bet-
ter understanding of how risks are disclosed and why. Concerning the lat-
ter question, in a related study on the economic incentives for voluntary
reporting on internal risk management and control systems, Deumes and
Knechel (in press) show that Dutch-listed companies disclose less infor-
mation when they face fewer information and agency problems, as prox-
ied for by the degree of ownership concentration, managerial ownership,
and financial leverage. Future research could investigate if these factors
also influence the quantity and quality of risk disclosure.
Implications
For corporate communication researchers, a potential implication of this
study is that it requires rethinking the role of corporate communication.
Seemingly grounded in uncertainty reduction theory (Berger & Calabrese,
1975), Kohut and Segars (1992) posit that a major goal of communicators
is to reduce the audience’s uncertainty through language and information.
According to Brashers (2001), this traditional and more narrow conceptual-
ization of communication in uncertainty reduction has long dominated com-
munication research. In his view, “the field’s historic focus on uncertainty
reduction is both a cause and symptom of underdeveloped ideas about
uncertainty and methods of managing it” (p. 478).
15 In the context of cor-
porate risk reporting, a better way to think about the role of corporate com-
munication may be to revise constituencies’ perceptions of uncertainty. For
example, as soon as managers obtain inside information about new and
major risks threatening the company, they may desire to communicate this
to investors in order to warn them by increasing investors’ perception of
uncertainty. For example, managers may decide to point out to investors that
details of the company’s situation are more ambiguous, more complex,
more unpredictable, and more probabilistic than investors may be aware of
or that investors should not be overconfident about their state of knowledge
because certain information is unavailable to outsiders or simply inconsis-
tent. By doing so, managers can make it less likely that they later suddenly
fail investors’ expectations of what their company can (or cannot) provide
or achieve. This strategy can protect both companies’ and managers’ long-
term reputation. At other times, managers may want to send reassuring mes-
sages in order to decrease investors’perceptions of uncertainty, for example,
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if a previously communicated threat ceases to exist. In a broader sense, the
same principle arguably applies to corporate communication with other con-
stituencies, such as customers, employees, and communities, on health,
safety, and environmental risks, for example.
For corporate communication
researchers, a potential implication of
this study is that it requires rethinking
the role of corporate communication.
An important implication of the findings for financial communication
practitioners is that risk disclosure in prospectuses can be viewed as an
area of best practice when it comes to corporate risk communication.
Analyzing Enron’s demise, Seeger and Ulmer (2003) conclude that open-
ness to signs of problems is a key communication-based responsibility of
companies. The findings of this study suggest that maintaining prospectus
standards of risk disclosure in, for example, annual and quarterly reports
can help companies to fulfill this responsibility. For financial regulators,
an implication of this study is that current requirements for risk factor dis-
closure in prospectuses seem to be effective.
Future Research
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
long required companies to disclose risk factors in registration statements.
As from December 2005, the requirement to disclose risk factors also
applies to annual reports. Furthermore, companies must update the risk fac-
tor section in their quarterly reports to reflect material changes from previ-
ously disclosed risk factors (SEC, 2005). Despite these developments in
practice, our understanding of the role of risk disclosure in corporate com-
munication is limited. For example, how are the risks disclosed in terms of
readability, linguistic structure, or rhetorical elements? What is the under-
standability and significance of risk factor disclosure to different groups of
investors and other constituencies? What is the comparability of risk factor
disclosure across countries, companies, and across time? What are compa-
nies’ motivations for risk factor disclosure? What explains companies’
choice of the level of risk factor disclosure? Does risk factor disclosure alter
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investors’ perceptions of uncertainty and/or investment decisions? How
does risk factor disclosure impact on companies’stock price, cost of capital,
and reputation? These are important but also difficult questions to investi-
gate. Because the questions extend beyond the boundaries of corporate
communication research, some of them will be best considered in collabo-
ration with researchers in other fields, particularly accounting and finance.
NOTES
1. Contemplating the past, present, and future of business communication research,
Janis Forman recognized the need to align the field more clearly with a business function,
like corporate communication, which is becoming increasingly important in business orga-
nizations (Suchan & Charles, 2006). This suggestion echoes Argenti (1996), who, in an
effort to define corporate communication as a discipline, distinguishes various subfunc-
tions of corporate communication, including financial communication. The latter subfunc-
tion, also called investor or shareholder relations, deals with the financial media, financial
analysts, and investors.
2. In essence, security prices equal expected discounted payoffs. In valuing securities,
investors account for the delay and for the risk of its payoffs. While the effect of time is
not difficult to figure out, corrections for risk are usually much more important and chal-
lenging (Cochrane, 2005).
3. Market risk is defined in these studies as the risk of loss arising from adverse
changes in interest rates, foreign currency rates, commodity prices, and equity prices
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 1997).
4. Finding no association would suggest that managers are unable or unwilling to dis-
close the right information. Lacking clear theoretical predictions, I formulate no expecta-
tions. Essentially, the goal of testing the associations is to explore what is disclosed in risk
factor sections. Factual evidence on this issue is limited and can help raising questions and
hypotheses for further research on how and why risk factors are disclosed.
5. In this period, 94 firms issued securities on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. I could
not retrieve the prospectus for 4 firms.
6. There were no differences in mandatory requirements among the different types of
security offerings investigated.
7. In terms of market liquidity, an important aspect of stock market development, the
Netherlands ranks among the top of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries (Bortolotti, de Jong, Nicodano, & Schindele, 2007).
8. Only Simunic and Stein (1987) report that since the reporting requirements are
rather general and allow considerable latitude in the nature, degree, and form of disclosure,
they initially (but unsuccessfully) tried to classify the risk factors as they appeared in the
prospectus in categories.
9. See Didow, Keller, Barksdale, and Franke (1985) for a presentation of the general
form of the PRINCIPALS transformation and an illustration of its usefulness in the con-
text of attitude research.
10. The slope coefficient β1 in all models is central to the analysis. The variable ε is
called the error term in the relationship and represents other factors that affect the explained
variable. The intercept parameter β0 is not relevant.
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11. Alternatively, I included four indicator variables to control for each offering type.
This led to identical conclusions for all analyses.
12. March and Shapira (1987) point out that managers associate risk primarily with
negative outcomes and do not treat uncertainty about positive outcomes as an important
aspect of risk.
13. In accordance with managers’ focus on negative outcomes, Baird and Thomas
(1990) and Olsen (1997) find that investors view risk as size of loss or potential for loss
rather than as variance of returns. Additionally, investors associate risk with lack of infor-
mation and lack of control.
14. The total amount of variance to be explained (the “trace”) is equal to the total num-
ber of risk factors (i.e., 48). The eigenvalues represent the amount of variance accounted
for by each dimension. Larger eigenvalues indicate dimensions that are of more impor-
tance in the overall solution. The percentage of variance accounted for by each dimension
is equal to the eigenvalue divided by the trace.
15. See Bradac (2001) for a discussion of several theories that examine the role of com-
munication in producing and coping with subjective uncertainty.
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